Abstract
Introduction 2 The Basic Model

✽✸
The basic model considered here is a model of those unilateral accidents that can be said to ✽✹ occur very often and where a potential injurer (T) can choose to take precaution x to reduce the ✽✺ probability of an accident p (x) at a decreasing rate (p ′ < 0; p ′′ > 0) where p (x) is assumed to be ✽✻ continuously differentiable. The harm suffered by the victim and the damages to be paid by an ✽✼ injurer in an accident are denoted by h and d. The timing of the model is as followed (see Figure 1 ). At time t = 0 Nature allocates potential ✾✵ injurers to one of two types θ ∈ {θ ,θ } with probabilityq andq whereθ >θ (First Extension).
✾✶
This information is hidden from potential injurers and the social planner, and only the probabilities ✾✷ are known as indicated by the dashed line in Figure 1 (Second Extension). At time t = 1 potential ✾✸ injurers not knowing their own type have to choose how much precaution x to take. The probability ✾✹ that potential injurers will be involved in an accident is given byθ p (x) andθ p (x) withθ p (x) ≤ 1 ✾✺ andθ p (x) ≥ 0 whereθ p (x) >θ p (x) for any given level of precaution taken x. At time t = 2 ✾✻ potential injurers are divided into two groups: A and ¬A. The group whose members had an ✾✼ accident before t = 2 is denoted by A and the group whose members did not have an accident is ✾✽ denoted by ¬A (Third Extension). The precaution that the members of each group take at time t = 2 ✾✾ can now be denoted by x A and x ¬A .
✶✵✵
At time t = 1 the (expected) proportion of potential injurers of typeθ and of typeθ in the population are given byσ andσ withσ =q andσ =q. At time t = 2 the proportions areσ A and σ A for the group that had an accident andσ ¬A andσ ¬A for the group that did not have an accident.
The relationship between these parameters and those mentioned previously can be seen in Figure 1 and can be written down as:σ
These are thus the conditional probabilities that a member of group A or ¬A is of typeθ orθ where the probability of an accident or not is given by q A and q ¬A (see the denominator):
It follows from the difference in the probability of an accident between the types (∀xθ p (x) > ✶✵✶θ p (x)) that the ratio of the proportion of typeθ to the proportion of typeθ is the highest for the ✶✵✷ group the members of which were involved in an accident and the lowest for the group the members ✶✵✸ of which were not involved in an accident: 3
In other words: the (low) high risk types are (under-) overrepresented in the group that had an ✶✵✺ accident at time t = 1 and are (over-) underrepresented in the group that did not have an accident at ✶✵✻ 3 Equation (2.7) can be re-written as:σθ
it holds here thatx =x as the information about the type of the potential injurer is hidden. Forσθ
σθ p(x) >σ σ it holds becauseθ >θ meaning that the number the numerator is multiplied with is larger than the number the denominator is multiplied with. Forσ σ >σ
(1−θ p(x)) σ (1−θ p(x)) it holds because the numerator is multiplied by a smaller number than the number the denominator is multiplied with: 1 −θ p (x) > 1 −θ p (x) which simplifies toθ >θ . time t = 1 compared to their proportion (σ )σ in the population. This is relevant when information ✶✵✼ about which potential injurer belongs to which type is hidden (x =x) from both the social planner ✶✵✽ and each potential injurer. The social planner can use this information to improve social welfare ✶✵✾ by tailoring the negligence standard to past accidents. Similarly potential injurers can use this ✶✶✵ information to adjust their care levels to improve their own private welfare. The extension to ✶✶✶ Shavell (1980 Shavell ( , 1987 that we thus consider is a dynamic unilateral accident model with hidden ✶✶✷ information, where both the social planner and the injurer are Bayesian updaters.
✶✶✸
3 The Social Planner's Problem ✶✶✹ Following Section 2 the social planner's problem can now be written down as the weighted sum -weighted by the probability of having an accident or not -of three social cost function (omitting arguments):
These three social cost functions are defined in equations (3.2), (3.3), and (3.4) as followed:
The first function is the sum of the total social cost due to the expected accident costs over the ✶✶✺ two types weighed by their share at time t = 1. The second function is the sum of the total social ✶✶✻ cost at time t = 2 for those potential injurers who were involved in an accident at time t = 1. The ✶✶✼ third function is the same as the second function but then for those potential injurers who were not ✶✶✽ involved in an accident at time t = 1. These last two are weighted by the probability of an accident ✶✶✾ and the total of all three adds up to the total social cost of an accident over two periods.
✶✷✵
By writing down the social planner's problem, the welfare implications of the social incentives The intuition for lemma 3.4 is that when conditioning on past accidents the group that did have ✶✼✵ an accident at t = 1 consists of a higher (lower) proportion of potential injurers that are of the type ✶✼✶ that have a high (low) probability of an accident than the population of potential injurers at t = 1.
✶✼✷
On average this group, therefore, has a higher probability of being involved in accident and this ✶✼✸ means that the standard of due care should go up. The same can be said to hold for the group that ✶✼✹ did not have an accident at t = 1. On average this group has a lower probability of being involved ✶✼✺ in accident and the standard of due care, therefore, should go down.
✶✼✻
The intuition for lemma 3.5 is that when conditioning on past accidents the total social costs ✶✼✼ of an accident are reduced at t = 2 compared to the situation when it is not possible to condition ✶✼✽ on past accidents. This means that the standard of due care at t = 1 can now be used to produce ✶✼✾ information to further reduce the cost of accidents at t = 2 by lowering this standard or to reduce ✶✽✵ the cost of accidents at t = 1 by raising this standard. If there is a large difference in the probability ✶✽✶ of accidents between the two types then the production of information is relatively more valuable, ✶✽✷ whereas if there is hardly any difference this information has relatively little value for reducing ✶✽✸ the costs of accidents at t = 2. At the same time the standard of due care at t = 1 can be used to ✶✽✹ re-allocate the costs of accidents between t = 1 and t = 2. This is relatively more valuable if the ✶✽✺ costs of accidents are high at t = 1 and low at t = 2. Which of these two effects dominates -the ✶✽✻ production of information or the redistribution of accident losses -depends on the parameters of ✶✽✼ the problem. 
Private Objective
✶✽✾
Having answered whether negligence standards should be tailored to past accidents in the affir-✶✾✵ mative, we need to solve for the private minimization problem of each potential injurer before we ✶✾✶ are able to implement the socially efficient solution. The timeline is the same as above. At t = 0 ✶✾✷ Nature moves and assigns each potential injurer her type. At t = 1 each potential injurer chooses ✶✾✸ how much precaution to take. At t = 2 each potential injurer again choose how much precaution to ✶✾✹ take.
✶✾✺
The potential injurer's objective function under imperfect information is equivalent to that of ✶✾✻ the social planner, and can be written as (omitting arguments):
The three private cost functions are T 1 for the first period, T A for the second period if an accident did occur, and T ¬A for the second period if an accident did not occur, and are defined as follows:
The private optimization problem is the same as the social optimization problem except with one ✶✾✽ difference. Whilst from the social planner's perspective,σ A ,σ ¬A ,σ A , andσ ¬A are functions of the ✶✾✾ precaution taken in the first period, for the potential injurer these are parameters when there are ✷✵✵ (infinitely) many pairs of potential injurers and victims.
✷✵✶
The following corollary and proposition can be said to hold for the private problem.
✷✵✷
Corollary 4.1. The lemmas 3.1, 3.4, and 3.5, the proposition 3.2, and the corollary 3.3 from the ✷✵✸ social problem carry over to the private problem. Step 1 To start with (i) the Lagrangian Λ can be formulated as:
1) This can be simplified using the fact that q A and q ¬A are the same as the denominator for σ A and ✸✵✽ σ ¬A for each type. The expression to minimize, therefore, becomes:
The FOCs for this problem are:
By eliminatingλ from equations (A.5) and (A.7) we find that:
By substituting the constraint in equation (A.9) into (A.11) we can re-write it as:
It follows thatλ * * = 0 (see equations (A.5) and (A.7) above) the same holds forλ * * proving (i).
✸✶✷
Step 2 To prove (ii) the Lagrangian to be minimized is re-formulated to be the following by:
By combining equations (A.16) and (A.17) λ A can be eliminated resulting in:
Substituting αq forq and βθ forθ the equation above can be re-arranged into:
Forx A =x A it follows that either the denominator is positive and the numerator negative or vice-
Forθ >θ or β > 0 it holds that the numerator is negative and the denominator positive. This means ✸✶✽ that for the potential injurer of typeθ the standard of due care implied by the social incentives is ✸✶✾ excessive,θ p ′ (x A ) h + 1 < 0 and that for the potential injurer of typeθ this standard of due care ✸✷✵ is inadequateθ p ′ (x A ) h + 1 > 0. It follows that in equilibrium λ * * A > 0. This is sufficient to prove ✸✷✶ (ii).
✸✷✷
Proof of Proposition 3.2. This proposition is equivalent to the statement that the shadow price λ * * ✸✷✸ is nonzero for minimization of the following the Lagrangian:
λ : x A − x ¬A = 0 (A.30)
Combining equations (A.28) and (A.29) λ can be elminated resulting in:
By substituting in the constraint this can be re-arranged into: .32) Comparing this with the FOC in equation (A.28) it follows that if λ * * = 0 thenθ =θ . This is a ✸✷✼ contradiction with thatθ >θ proving the proposition. (1−θ p(x)) σ (1−θ p(x)) , whereσ =q.
